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THE INTELLECTUALS: A CRITIQUE
Leon J. Apt
University of Arkansas
In recent years several self-conscious studies about intellectuals
have been published. To name but a few:1 Lewis Coser's Men of
ideas: a sociologist's view; Christopher Lasch's New radicalism in Amer-
ica: the intellectual as a social type; Lewis Feuer's The scientific intel-
lectual; Richard Hofsradter's Anti-intellectualism in American life; Jacque
Barzun's The house of intellect; and George Huszar's The intellectuals.
In general these studies either avoid the knotty question, "what
is an intellectual?" or they give us flabby answers. Coser, for example,
said that "intellectuals are gatekeepers of ideas and fountainheads of
ideologies. "2 Whatever is meant, the definition is broad and vague.
Barzun, although more precise, had a similar failing. He said that
intellectuals are men who carry brief cases. 3 Many writers have
criticized Barzun's statement. Hofstadter, for example, wrote: "Few
of us believe that a member of a profession, even a learned profession,
is necessarily an intellectual in any discriminatory or demanding sense
of the word."4 He went on to say — and quite rightly — that "we
know, for instance, that all academic men are not intellectuals." 5
However, he proposed a definition which, while narrower, was vaguer.
An intellectual, he implied, is a creative person: "We do not think of
him as being an intellectual if certain qualities are missing from his
work — disinterested intelligence, generalizing power, free speculation,
fresh observation, creative novelty, radical criticism." 6 (Most of us will
admit that whatever a creative person is, he is rare.) Feuer focused on
"men of science," those who insist on testing and on rejecting every-
thing that does not correspond with the so-called "facts of experience." 7
In a curiously dialectic way, he dealt with a tradition which denies the
validity of tradition as such. As for Huszar, he simply dodged the
problem of definition. After saying that he was using the word in
'(New York, Free Press, 1965); (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965);
(New York: Knopf, 1965); (New York: Knopf, 1963); (New York:
Harper, 1958); (New York: Free Press, 1960).
2Coser, Men of ideas, p. x.
3Barzun, House of intellect, introduction
4Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in American life, p. 26.
sibid.
©Ibid., p. 27.
7Feuer, The scientific intellectual introduction, and passim.
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¦q relatively broad sense, "8 he never quite explained in which "rela-
tively broad sense."
Confusion? Worse confounded! Paul Valery, a contemporary
literary critic, expressed his confused reaction in this way:
So, I was in my own abyss, unable to explain to a child, to
a savage, to an archangel — to myself, this word intellectual,
which gives nobody else any difficulty at all.
It wasn't that images failed me. On the contrary, every
time this terrible word consulted my mind, the oracle responded
with a different image. All were naive. Not one of them pre-
cisely annulled the sensation of not understanding.
Tatters of dream came to me.
I formed figures which I called Intellectuals.' Men almost
motionless, who caused great movement in the world. Or very
animated men, by the lively action of whose hands and mouths,
imperceptible objects were made manifest . . . Pardon me for
telling you the truth. I saw what I saw.
Men of thought, Men of letters, Men of science, Artists —
Causes, living causes, . . . minimal causes, causes within causes
and inexplicable to themselves — and causes whose effects were
as vain, but at the same time as prodigiously important, as I
wished. The universe of these causes and their effects existed and
did not exist. This system of strange acts, productions, and
prodigies had the all powerful and vacant reality of a game of
cards. Inspirations, meditations, works, glory, talents, it took
no more than a certain look to make these things nearly everything,
and a certain other look to reduce them to nearly nothing. . .9
Despite their weakness, these studies are not without keen insight
nor without considerable interest, especially Hofstadter's. For example,
he suggested that we may identify intellectuals by their pious and
playful attitudes toward ideas. 10 (Perhaps he meant that we can tell
an intellectual by his split personality or, better still, by his tendency
toward manic-depressive moods.) When, however, we consider piety
and playfulness separately, they seem more meaningful. By stressing
piety, Hofstadter meant that the intellectual lives for ideas, that he has
a sense of dedication to the life of the mind, somewhat like a religious
commitment; that he is engage — he is pledged, committed, and en-
listed. What most people are willing to admit, namely that ideas and
8Huszar (ed.), The intellectuals, p. 5.
9Paul Valery, Monsieur Teste, trans by Jackson Mathew (New York:
Knopf, 1948), pp. 61-62.
1oHofstadter, Anti-intellectualism, p. 27.
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abstractions are of major importance in human affairs, he conclusively
feels."
By piety Hofstadter probably meant to connote as well the idea
that the role of an intellectual is, in good measure, inherited from the
cleric. The clerical heritage is quite evident. Consider the tradition of
personal discipline — the Germans call it Sitzfleisch. Consider, too, the
traditional role of the cleric as caretaker of values, related to his own
search for truth. Moreover, the professional thinker's involvement with
symbols was said to have originated with the magical role of the
priest. Ed ShiIs, a University of Chicago sociologist, summed up the
tie between man of religion and man of ideas:
"
I.Intellectuals exhibit]
an unusual sensitivity to the sacred, an uncommon reflectiveness about
the nature of their universe, and the rules which govern their society .. .
[They] elicit, guide, and form the expressive dispositions within a
society. " 12
By piety, finally, Hofstadter meant to recall that intellectuals not
only are the upholders of the clerical tradition, they are also descendents
of the biblical prophets — "inspired madmen," 13 Coser calls them —
who attacked men of power, who, in short, represent the millenial, the
apocalyptic, the radical tradition. (More willbe said about the intel-
lectual and radicalism elsewhere in this paper. Suffice to say, mean-
while, that at best public opinion tends to think of him often as a
radical, as an "inspired madman.")
Hofstadter used the idea of play as a counterpoise to piety. That
is play checks the tendency of the committed intellectual to fanaticism.
Moreover, the intellectual, more than any other person, is aware of
the sheer delight in mental activity. We often speak of the play of
the mind, do we not? Little doubt, then, but that an intellectual
relished the play of the mind for its own sake. It very well might be,
too, that this element of playfulness is an important factor in creative
discovery, in the sense, at least, that an intellectual who enjoys playing
with ideas is apt to turn answers into questions.
The element of play has held a significant role in the history of
culture. Huizinga, a Dutch social historian, discussed this relationship
in his celebrated study, Homo ludens. 14 Likewise the role of profes-
sional jokesters is historically tied to intellectuals. Take the medieval
court jester, for instance. His chief social function was to play none
of the expected roles but to say and do only the unexpected. Outside
"Ibid., p. 28.
12Edward A. Shils, "The intellectuals and the powers: some perspectives
for comparative analysis," in Comparative studies in society and
history, I (Oct. 1958), p. 5.
13 Coser, Men of ideas, p. viii.
Beacon Press, 1955)
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of the social hierarchy, he could easily smile at, mimic, the usual social
proprieties. Classified among the lowly and uprooted, he was none-
theless permitted to criticize, to ridicule the high and the mighty.
Under the thin guise of laughter he satirized society's sacred cows.
Surely the court jester has relevance for our understanding of intellec-
tuals. 15 Their experience suggests that one is not free to prick the
publics conscience unless one is outside of the social establishment,
unless one is free, unless one is alienated. It suggests, too, the am-
bivalent relationship that jesters and intellectuals alike have often
shared with society. Tolerated most of the time, occasionally even
rewarded by society, they were, at the same time, scapegoats of
society. It is a part of the intellectual's tragedy that the things he
most values about himself and his work are quite unlike those society
values in him. Society values him — and never more than today —
because he can in fact be used for a variety of purposes, from popular
entertainment to the design of weapons. But his playfulness is apt to
seem a perverse luxury; his piety to seem nettlesome, if not actually
dangerous. And neither quality is considered to contribute very much
to the practical business of life.
Lasch came closest to defining with precision the term intellectual.
An intellectual, he said simply, is a critic of society. 16 This definition
has many advantages. First, it is quite consistent with the original use
of the term, apparently first coined during the Dreyfus Affair. During
the Affair the term acquired special meaning. It meant someone who
was anti-clerical, anti-militaristic, anti-aristocratic, yet largely opposed
to the values of a bourgeois society. He was identified with the revolu-
tionary tradition. In short, a Dreyfusard — and hence an intellectual —
was said to be a radical, an upholder of the Revolution, a critic of
society.
This definition tends to incorporate most of the descriptive ideas
about intellectuals. It incorporates the idea of the intellectual as
cleric, as philosopher, as moralist, as skeptic, as satirist. It embraces,
as well, the idea of alienation, which results often from a critic's clash
with society. It includes the romantic tradition, with its emphasis upon
individualism, and the populist tradition. (By populism I mean the
belief in the creativity and the superior moral worth of the ordinary
people.)
Lasch's definition would be considerably improved ifhe made two
deas more emphatic: first, the idea that the intellectual turns social
critic largely because of the contradiction which he, in his role as
custodian of morality, senses between what ought to be and what
appears to be; second, that the intellectual, bent on making human
existence appear rational and right, communicates his ideas to society
which often finds them threatening. An intellectual, therefore, is a
15Ralf Dahrendorf, "Der Intellektuelle uno die Gesellschaft,
' Zeit, 13
(March 29, 1963).
16Lasch, The new radicalism, p. ix.
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social critic who persists on finding rational and empirical norms for
what should be and who insists on communicating his critical thoughts.
Admittedly, this definition has at least two significant weaknesses;
1) It tends to exclude the thinker that shares all or some of the follow-
ing values: authoritarianism, elitism, irrationalism, a tendency toward
orthodoxy in religion, and, above all, fears change and prefers social
stability. The suggested definition, in other words, eliminates those
thinkers who are anti-intellectual. (They are anti-intellectual, it is
emphasized, for many reasons, the most important being because they
oppose the skeptical tradition, believing that excessive intellectual
analysis or discussion can disrupt the foundation of order which they
prize above all.) This deficiency can be handled easily enough — by
calling such thinkers as Edmund Burke "anti-intellectual intellectuals,"
or, if one finds this combination of words objectionable, call them
"anti-intellectualist intellectuals." 17 Whatever we call them, the history
of intellectuals, sadly enough, has been dominated by the anti-intel-
lectual intellectuals, by those who fear and oppose social critics, and
not by intellectuals who see their historical role as being social critics.
2) Most academicians reject this definition. There very rejection,
however, attests more to the decline of radicalism in America than to
any essential shortcoming which the proposed definition may have.
Several factors account for the decline of radicalism.
1) Social legislation and state intervention in economic life, the
two central policies of the government from the New Deal to the Great
Society, aroused the enthusiasm as it dulled the criticism of many in-
tellectuals and near intellectuals. For their essential political and social
expectations were being realized.
2) Liberalism, not radicalism, emerged with enhanced prestige
after World War II. Itwent from one triumph to another, saved by the
unexpected success of the capitalist order in sustaining a decent standard
of living; saved, in the last analysis by the contemporary thirty years'
war, hot and cold, which made that feat possible. Similarly, liberals
point to their continued success at the polls which proves, they maintain,
that unlike the radicals, they, at least, could be elected to power.
3) The ranks of liberals were increased and those of the radicals
diminished by defectors from the revolutionary camp, and these recruits
brought to liberalism the same polemical gifts, the same sense of com-
mitment, and the same intolerance of opposition which they had learned
as Bolsheviks.
17Morton White uses this definition. See his "Reflections as Anti-
intellectualism," Daedalus (Summer, 1962), pp. 457-68. White makes
a distinction between the anti-intellectual, who is hostile to intellec-
tuals, and the anti-intellectualist, who is critical of the claims of
Rational intellect in knowledge and in life.
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4) Liberalism thrived after the war and radicalism declined
because the idea of ideology, itself, became increasingly suspect;
pragmatism now dominates the intellectual scene, to the point where
it itself has become somewhat of an ideology. A recent critic analyzed
this rise of political pragmatism: "Pragmatism has been wrongly called
the philosophy of the practical man. It represents the anti-intellectual-
ism of the American intellectual, who is overawed by the practical
sweep of American life."18 He observed that "in no country of the
world is there such a tremendous gap between the values recognized
by intellectuals and the values that actually govern political and
economic realities." 19 Despite the deplorable circumstance, he con-
tinued to say, "in no country is the intellectual so preoccupied with
affecting the course of politics to the exclusion of his intellectual inter-
ests. The less power he has of determining conditions, the more pas-
sionate, it would seem, is his will-o'the wisp quest of political influ-
ence." 20 It is here that the philosophy of pragmatism is most revealing.
5) The current liberal theory of pluralism is passionately opposed
to the radical tradition. Consider, for example, the attacks of liberals
upon the Berkeley Free Speech Movement. 21 They denounced the FSM
as a threat to law and order and upheld stability as a morality unto
itself. In effect, the "pluralists" said that no matter what the circum-
stances were, the students committed some kind of crime in bypassing
normal processes of change, i.e., in not operating through the so-called
channels.
The "pluralists 1" emphasis on stability should not be taken to
mean that they are opposed to political conflict. But conflict, they argue,
should take place between contending leaders and political elites, as
Seymour Lipset calls them. Conflict is healthy when it is between groups
with different interests, so long as they do not seek to transform the
political structure. So long as the demands of these groups are limited,
the more conflicting groups the better.
"Equilibrium" is the metaphor commonly used by the "pluralists"
to describe their social ideal. Equilibrium means balancing: the pair-
ing-off of opposing forces and attitudes that negate each other and
thus preserve the existing institutional structure, with only marginal
changes. This kind of balancing means limited popular participation
in politics, limited commitment of individuals or groups to principles
and a "polity" which gives the widest latitude in decision-making to
18Benjamin Ginzburg, "Science under Communism" New republic, LXIX
(Jan. 6, 1932), pp. 208-09.
19 lbid.
2O lbid.
21For a discussion of the "pluralists" and the Berkeley FSAA, James F.
Petras and Michael Shute, "Communications: Berkeley '65," Partisan
Review, (Spring, 1965), pp. 314-23.
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those already in decision-making positions. The values which the
"pluralists' called democratic in actuality are a threat to the vision of
an open society, for they actually describe the means to preserve an
elitist, a bureaucratic society. To this extent, they are anti-intellectual
intellectuals.
6) The complex society which emerged after World Yar II has
likewise contributed to the decline of radicalism in America. For one
thing, it increased the demand for an educated class. Many new jobs
at relatively high salaries suddenly became available in the academy,
in government, and in industry. The prices which professional thinkers
paid for their rise in status is high
— by joining the establishment they
have given up much of their freedom. Whereas, in the past, young
scholars faced an unfriendly world alone, or together in their bohemias,
they now sink into middle class suburbs, country homes, country clubs,
and college towns. Far more insidious is that slow attrition which has
removed the challenge, the whole idea of the intellectual vocation —
the idea of a life dedicated to values that cannot be realized by a
commercial, capitalistic civilization.
7) The rise of a so-called "mass culture" has reinforced the
liberal community's fears of democratic movement. They prefer a
cultural elitism.
8) Finally, old radicals and liberals alike view the cultural expres-
sions of the new radicals with hostility, calling them beatniks, or hip-
sters, or dropouts. In at least one important cultural sense the new
radicals are dropouts — dropouts from history. The withdrawal from
school, so typical of their generation, and so inscrutable to ours, is
best understood as an existential symbol of their rejection of the notion
of cultural continuity and progress, which our graded education system
represents in institutional form. Lester Fiedler has described the new
radicals with understanding:
It is not merely a matter of their rejecting what happens to
have happened just before them, as the young do, after all, in every
age,- but of their attempting to disavow the very idea of the past,
of their seeking to avoid recapitulating it step by step — up to
the point of graduation into the present.
Specifically, the tradition from which they strive to disengage
is the tradition of the human, as the West has defined it, Humanism
itself, and more especially, the cult of reason. . ,22
The new radicals, in short, are manifesting, in an exaggerated but
significant way, the same tendencies as the liberals. Yet liberals are
equally firm in using the new radicals to justify their disillusionment,
or plain opposition to radicalism.
22Leslie A. Fiedler, "The new mutants," Partisan Review (Fall, 1965),
p. 509.
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